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MAKING GATT DOLPHIN-SAFE: TRADE AND
THE ENVIRONMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
A recent GATT panel ruling has declared a United States law
intended to protect dolphins to be anti-free trade.2 The United States
instituted an embargo of Mexican tuna products because of Mexican
harvesting methods that caused incidental dolphin killings in violation
of the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA).3 Mexico took
the case to a GATT dispute settlement panel, arguing that the ban was
both an extraterritorial application of United States law4 and an
improper restriction on international trade cloaked as an environmental
protection measure.5 The GATT panel heard the complaint and found
for Mexico.6
The decision calls into question the validity of numerous United
States environmental protection statutes that seek to use trade measures
to enforce environmental goals 7 United States trade officials are
concerned that the decision affects the ability of the United States to use
trade measures to further such environmental goals as the protection of
the ozone layer, protection of endangered species, and the regulation of
whaling.' William K. Reilly, Chief of the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), expressed his opinion that the decision could "unravel all
the strings" of United States environmental policy.9 The panel decision
highlights a conflict between the goals of free trade and environmental
protection. To be effective, environmental protection measures may
require the creation of the same types of trade barriers that GATT seeks
to eliminate. Reconciling this conflict may be the most important trade
issue of the 1990s.10
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, openedfor signature Oct. 30,1947,61 Stat. A3,
55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
2. United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Report of the Panel, GATT Doc. DS21/R
(Sept. 3, 1991) (on file with Office of the United States Trade Representative) [hereinafter Panel
Decision]. The challenged law was the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407
(1988), as amended by 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1361-1407 (West Supp. 1992).
3. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407.
4. See Panel Decision, supra note 2, para. 3.31.
5. Id. para. 3.58.
6. Id. para. 7.1.
7. Members of Congress Protest Recent GATT Ruling on U.S. Embargo of Mexican Tuna, 8
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 1399 (Sept. 25, 1991) [hereinafter Members Protest].
8. Paul Magnusson et al., Save the Dolphins - Or Free Trade?, Bus. WK. INDus./TECHN.
ED., Feb. 17, 1992, at 130D.
9. Id.
10. Mr. Michael Smith, a former Deputy United States Trade Representative, describes
the conflict between free trade and environmental sanctions in these terms. Nancy Dunne,
Environment Rules Set Stage for GATT Conflicts, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1991, at 7.
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The purpose of this Note is to evaluate the panel decision in light of
its effects on free trade and the environment and to suggest ways that
these competing interests may be accommodated in the future. First, the
events leading to the dispute are examined. Second, the embargo and
the panel decision are analyzed. Third, the decision's political
ramifications and its potential effects on the continuing GAT and North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiations are discussed.
Finally, various options for addressing the conflict between free trade
and the environment are explored.
II. BACKGROUND TO THE DISPUTE: THE MMPA
In the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP), yellowfin tuna are often
found swimming beneath schools of dolphins." This association occurs
only in the ETP.1'2 Commercial tuna fleets exploit the phenomenon by
using the "purse-seine" method of fishing. 3 Although purse-seining
is an extremely effective method of tuna harvesting, it leads to high rates
of dolphin mortality.4 In the early 1970s the United States tuna fleet
was killing more than 300,000 dolphins annually
In 1972, Congress responded to this problem by passing the
MMIPA. 6  The primary purpose of the MMPA was to reduce the
number of marine mammals incidentally killed during commercial
fishing operations to "insignificant levels approaching a zero mortality
and serious injury rate." 7 The MMPA deals specifically with the taking
of tuna in the ETP, and contains numerous provisions covering the
activities of persons subject to United States jurisdiction in that area. 8
Section 1371(a) of the MMPA allows limited "takings" by United
States fishermen of marine mammals in connection with tuna harvesting,
if a permit is obtained from the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS).' The NMFS has issued only one such permit, to the
American Tuna-boat Association.' Under the terms of the permit, the
11. Panel Decision, supra note 2, para. 2.2. The reasons for this association are unknown.
David M. Levin, Toward Effective Cetacean Protection, 12 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 549, 562 (1979).
12. Panel Decision, stipra note 2, para. 2.2.
13. Purse-seine fishing involves the use of a weighted net that is attached at either end
to a fishing vessel and a motorboat. The motorboat encircles a school of dolphins with the net,
then returns and attaches its end to the fishing vessel. A cable running along the bottom of the
net is winched in, drawing the bottom of the net closed ("pursing") and trapping inside the net
both tuna and dolphin. In this way, the entire school of tuna may be taken. Id. para. 2.1.
14. See Levin, supra note 11, at 562-65.
15. 134 CONG. REc. S16,336, S16,344 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (statement of Sen. Breaux).
16. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407.
17. Id. § 1371(a)(2).
18. Id. § 1371(a)(2)(B).
19. Id. §§ 1371(a)(2), 1374.
20. Panel Decision, supra note 2, para. 2.4.
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Association is permitted to incidentally kill 20,500 dolphins per year
during its tuna harvesting operations.2' The permit covers all domestic
tuna fishing in the ETP.2
The MMPA requires the Secretary of the Treasury to ban imported
fish and fish products from third countries, if such commodities were
harvested using methods that lead to incidental marine mammal deaths
or injuries in excess of United States levels.' The Act also requires the
United States to impose an embargo on imports from intermedia 7
nations that buy such products for re-export to the United States.
Special provisions of the MMPA deal with the ETP and third-country
takings of dolphins. The average incidental taking rate for individual
third countries may not exceed 1.25 times the incidental taking rate of
United States vessels in the period being measured.' If a country
exceeds this limit, a mandatory embargo of that country's fish products
will be instituted.26
In April 1990, the three largest United States tuna canners announced
that in the future, in response to pressure from animal-rights groups,
they would buy only "dolphin-safe" tuna.' Subsequent, Congress
passed the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act. Under the
provisions of this Act, tuna products cannot be labelled dolphin-safe if,
during tuna harvesting, purse-seine nets were used to encircle
dolphins.29 The United States tuna fleet reacted to this development by
moving nearly all of its operations to the western Pacific, where tuna
and dolphins do not associate.'
The United States fleet's departure from the ETP had important
effects on other nations' tuna harvesting operations. As stated earlier,
the tuna/dolphin phenomenon is observed only in the ETP, and the
special tuna/dolphin provisions in the MMPA are limited to that area.'
With the United States tuna fleet gone from the ETP, United States
dolphin takings in that area should, theoretically, approach zero. Since
the third-country taking allowances set forth in the MMPA are based on
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2).
24. Id. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(ii)MV(C).
25. Id. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(ii)(I).
26. Id. § 1371(a)(2).
27. TUNA: COMPEITIVE CONDITIONS AmFECTING THE U.S. AND EUROPEAN TUNA INDUSTRIES
IN DOMESTIc AND FOREIGN MARKETS, REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON FINANcE, U.S. SENATE, AND
THE COMMiTTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, INVESTIGATION No. 332-
291 UNDER SEcTION 332 Op THE TARIFF Acr oF 1930, USITC PUBLICATION 2339,31 (1990) (on file
with United States International Trade Commission) [hereinafter COMPEITIVE CONDITIONS].
28. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1385. The Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act is a 1990
amendment to the MMPA.
29. Id. §§ 1385(d)(1)(B)-(d)(2).
30. Panel Decision, supra note 2, paras. 3.14-3.15.
31. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B).
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a percentage comparison to United States taking levels rather than on a
numerical limit," a third country whose fleet incidentally takes any
dolphins in the ETP may now be subject to an import ban?3 Third
countries are faced with the choice of violating the MMPA or altogether
ceasing purse-seine fishing in the ETP. 4
This result leaves countries like Mexico with few alternatives. The
Mexican tuna fleet will have to stop purse-seining in the ETP if it wishes
to comply with the MMPA. However, the ETP encompasses the whole
of the Mexican west coast, so compliance effectively prohibits them
from purse-seining in their own exclusive economic zone (EEZ). 6 One
alternative is to follow the United States example and fish only in areas
where dolphins and tuna do not associate, such as the western Pacific.
However, Mexican fishing vessels are unable to make the long trips
required to fish in such areas" Another alternative is to fish for
smaller tuna. Dolphins tend to associate only with large tuna," so
Mexican fishermen should be able to catch the smaller fish in the ETP
without dolphins in their nets.
There are problems, however, with pursuing smaller tuna. First,
processing costs are higher for small tuna than for large tuna.39 This
would put the Mexican tuna fleet at a competitive disadvantage with
regard to those fleets not fishing in the ET. Second, concentrating on
younger tuna runs the risk of exhausting ETP tuna stocks. The Inter-
American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) recently adopted a
recommendation that urges members to preserve tuna stocks by
concentrating their fishing on adult tuna, despite the fact that such tuna
swim with dolphins.4 Thus, if the Mexicans continue purse-seine tuna
harvesting activities in the ETP, they are destined to violate either the
IATrC or the MMPA requirements.
32. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
33. Panel Decision, supra note 2, para. 3.22.
34. Id. para. 4.28. This choice was made especially difficult after a recent National
Research Council study concluded that there is no real alternative to the use of such nets in the
ETP. See Michael Parrish, Dolphin Study Rejects Ban On Tuna Nets, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1992, at
Al.
35. See Panel Decision, supra note 2, para. 3.14.
36. A coastal state may establish an exclusive economic zone, or EEZ, extending up to
200 nautical miles from its coast. Within the zone, the coastal state has "sovereign rights for
the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing" its natural resources.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, art. 56, 21
LL.M. 1261, 1280.
37. Atchison Enters Mexico Tuna War, San Diego Daily Transcript, Oct. 29, 1991, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
38. CoMwErmIvE CONDITIONS, supra note 27, at 33.
39. Id.
40. Panel Decision, supra note 2, para. 4.26. The IATTC is a multilateral treaty organization
of which the United States is a member. Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-
American Tropical Tuna Commission, May 31, 1949, U.S.-Costa Rica, 1 U.S.T. 230.
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III. THE EMBARGO AND ITS AFTERMATH
On August 28, 1990, a United States District Court ordered the
United States to impose an embargo on importation of Mexican tuna
products.41 The embargo went into effect on February 22, 1991. 4'
The Mexican government responded by accusing the United States
of enacting protectionist measures under environmental pretexts.'
First, Mexico noted that the embargo was instituted only after the United
States fleet had left the ETP.4' This, in Mexico's view, demonstrated the
protectionist nature of the ban and exposed the true motivations behind
the embargo - to close Mexican tuna out of the United States market.4
Second, the Mexican government charged that the United States was
applying the trade restrictions in order to pressure Mexico into allowing
the United States fleet access to Mexican waters.' These accusations
were echoed by some of the third parties that made submissions to the
panel.' Moreover, the Mexican press circulated a theory charging that
the embargo was being used to force Mexico to open its oil monopoly to
foreign companies.'
On January 25, 1991, Mexico requested the creation of a panel49
under Article XXIII(2) of GAT.'s That panel was formed on February
41. Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964, 975-76 (N.D. Cal. 1990), affd, 929
F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991). The order mandated an embargo of tuna products from Mexico,
Venezuela, Vanuatu, Panama, and Ecuador. Id. Panama and Ecuador were exempted from the
embargo after they ordered their fleets to cease encircling dolphins. Panel Decision, supra note
2, para. 2.7. Vanuatu was exempted on January 23,1992, after it demonstrated that ETP purse-
seining operations by its nine-vessel tuna fleet were relatively small in scale. Government Asks
Appeals Court to Overturn Tuna Embargo and Stay Order Pending Appeal, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
No. 6, at 234, 235 (Feb. 5, 1992).
On March 15,1991, the NMFS announced that the ban would be extended to intermediary
nations that imported Mexican and Venezuelan tuna for re-export to the United States, pursuant
to § 1371(a)(2)(B)(ii)(V)(C) of the MMPA. Panel Decision, supra note 2, para. 2.11. Although the
NMFS announced that the ban would commence on May 24,1991, it actually was not imposed
until January 10, 1992. See infra notes 87-93 and accompanying text for the international
response to the United States action.
42. Panel Decision, supra note 2, para. 2.7.
43. Id. para. 3.58.
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. Id.
47. E.g., id. para. 4.15 (Indonesia); id. para. 4.24 (Thailand); id. para. 4.29 (Venezuela).
48. Laurence Iliff, Conservation or Conspiracy?, Bus. Mex., Apr. 1991, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Omni File.
49. The panels function as part of the GATT dispute settlement machinery. When two
parties have a dispute, a panel is created to hear the complaints. The panel conducts a hearing,
reaches a conclusion, and then submits its findings to the GATT Council. The Council adopts
the panel decision (it has never rejected a panel report), thereby giving the report's
recommendations legal force, and requests the losing party to take appropriate steps to settle
the dispute. OuvIER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT MULTU.ATERAL TRADE
SYSTEM 77 (1985).
50. Panel Decision, supra note 2, para. 1.1. Article XXIII is the primary section for dispute
Spring 1992]
350 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 2:2
6, 1991.V ' It held hearings on May 14-15 and June 17, 1991, and
submitted its conclusions to the parties on August 16, 1991.52
Mexico requested the panel to find that the embargo provisions
contained in the MMPA were inconsistent with GATT prohibitions of
quantitative restrictions under Article XI of GATT, and discriminatory
in violation of Article XIIf.' Mexico also alleged a violation of the "like
products" requirement of Article HI1 and violations of Articles I and
X.O Mexico asked the panel to recommend that the contracting parties
request the United States to bring its regulations into conformity with
GATT requirements.Y The United States requested that the panel find
that the United States measures either did not violate GAIT provisions,
or else fell under Article XX exceptions, and asked the panel to reject
settlement under GATT. JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCiURING THE GAIT SYSTEM 62 (1990). The
treaty emphasizes consultation, and recourse to the dispute settlement machinery is allowed
only after bilateral and/or multilateral consultations between the aggrieved parties have failed.
Id.
51. Panel Decision, supra note 2, para. 1.1.
52. Id. para. 1.3.
53. Id. para. 3.1(a). Article XI states that no contracting party may impose "prohibitions
or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective through quotas,
import or export licenses or other measures... on the importation of any product... of any
other contracting party...." GATT, supra note 1, art. X1, 61 Stat. at A32-33, 55 U.N.T.S. at 224-
26. The article contains limited exceptions at XI(2), but the United States did not claim these
to be applicable.
54. Panel Decision, supra note 2, para. 3.1(a). Article XIII mandates nondiscriminatory
administration of quantitative restrictions. GATT, supra note 1, art. XIII, 61 Stat. at A40, 55
U.N.T.S. at 234. Mexico alleged that the ban and the MMPA provisions ran contrary to Article
XIII because they only affected yellowfin tuna from the ETP, and did not address yellowfin
from other regions. It was alleged that this would benefit the United States tuna fleet, which
had moved out of the ETP. Panel Decision, supra note 2, para. 3.14.
55. Article III requires a state to accord no less favorable treatment to the products of
another contracting party than it does to like products of national origin. GAIT, supra note 1,
art. 111, 61 Stat. at A18, 55 U.N.T.S. at 206. Mexico alleged that Mexican tuna products were
being treated differently than like United States tuna products; the United States countered that
all ETP purse-seine harvested tuna was treated similarly. See Panel Decision, supra note 2, paras.
3.16, 3.20.
56. Panel Decision, supra note 2, para. 3.3. These complaints were directed at the Dolphin
Protection Consumer Information Act. Article IX of GATT mandates nondiscriminatory
application of product marking requirements. GATr, supra note 1, art. IX, 61 Stat. at A29-30,
55 U.N.T.S. at 220-22. Article I calls for equal treatment for products from all contracting
parties. Id. art. I, 61 Stat. at A12, 55 U.N.T.S. at 196-98.
57. Panel Decision, supra note 2, para. 3.5.
58. Id. paras. 3.6-3.8. The United States argued that, even if the measures were otherwise
inconsistent with GATT provisions, they were covered by Article XX(b) and XX(g) exceptions.
Id. para. 3.6(b). Article XX states that certain measures may be excepted from GATF so long
as they "are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade." GATT, spra note 1, art. XX, 61 Stat. at A60-61, 55 U.N.T.S.
at 262. Article XX(b) excepts those measures that are "necessary to protect human, animal or
plant life or health." Id. art. XX(b), 61 Stat. at A61, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262. Article XX(g) addresses
those measures "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures
are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption."
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Mexico's complaint. 9
On August 16,1991, the panel issued its decision, concluding that the
United States tuna import restrictions are contrary to certain GATT
provisions. The panel stated that the MMPA violated Article XI of
GAT and that a determination of the Article XIII issue was therefore
unnecessary.6 The United States measures were also found to violate
Article nI.61 The panel stated that Article III does not allow a party to
discriminate against another party's products on the basis of the method
of production. 2
The panel also addressed the United States' arguments concerning
Article XX exceptions. In what is perhaps the most important part of the
ruling, the panel stated that the Article XX exceptions serve to protect
only those conservation measures that do not have extrajurisdictional
effect.' A country, the panel stated, "may not restrict imports of a
product merely because it originates in a country with environmental
policies different from its own."6' Accordingly, the United States was
faulted for having tried unilaterally to effect conservation measures that
the panel felt could better have been achieved through multilateral
agreements.' The panel recommended that the contracting parties ask
the United States to take the necessary steps to bring the provisions of
the MMPA and the United States import restrictions into conformity
with GATT requirements.'
IV. THE REACTION TO THE PANEL DECISION
The decision produced a strong reaction among many members of
Congress and environmental protection groups. The congressional
reaction stems from the perceived impact of the decision on both United
States environmental laws and international treaties. Under the
language of the decision, any law or treaty using trade measures to
encourage third-country compliance with domestic or international
environmental standards may be invalidated.67
Id. art. XX(g), 61 Stat. at A61, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262.
59. Panel Decision, supra note 2, para. 3.9.
60. Id. paras. 5.18-5.19.
61. Id. para. 5.15.
62. Id.
63. Id. para. 5.32.
64. Id. para. 6.2.
65. The panel said the United States should have tried to negotiate "international
cooperative arrangements" to accomplish its environmental objectives. If the United States had
done so and had been rebuffed, the panel suggests that the ban might have been allowable.
Id. para. 5.28.
66. Id. para. 7.1(c).
67. See Jessica Mathews, Dolphins, Tuna and Free Trade; No Country Can Protect Its Own
Smidgen of Air or Ocean, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1991, at A21.
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Representative Barbara Boxer, in letters that she and sixty-two of her
colleagues sent to President Bush and United States Trade Representative
Carla Hills, noted that the ruling could potentially invalidate trade
measures that the United States applies to promote conservation outside
of United States jurisdiction.' Some of the measures subject to
invalidation under the decision, according to Representative Boxer, are
those protecting rain forests, whales, and African elephants.69  The
members of Congress who signed the letters stated that GATT
procedures must be reformed to provide protections for such
environmental protection measures.'
Representative Boxer's group was not alone in calling for changes to
GATT. A resolution was introduced in the House of Representatives
which calls on Congress to reject any future GAIT agreement that
threatens to undermine United States environmental protection laws.'
Subcommittee Chairman Henry Waxman stated that it is GAT, rather
than United States law, that must be changed to accommodate United
States environmental protection statutes.' The Senate reacted similarly
to the panel decision.'
The environmentalist reaction has been equally strong. Ralph Nader
charged that "today's GATT is anti-democratic and anti-consumer in the
most profound sense."74 Jessica Mathews, Vice President of the World
Resources Institute, called the panel decision "legally sound, but...
environmental nonsense." ' Others have criticized the GATT dispute
68. Letter from Representative Barbara Boxer et al., United States House of
Representatives, to Carla A. Hills, United States Trade Representative (Sept. 18, 1991)
[hereinafter Boxer Letter] (on file with author); Members Protest, supra note 7, at 1399.
Representative Boxer herself labeled the decision "inhumane," and stated that the United States
has a "fundamental right" to engage in conservation measures like those challenged in the
panel decision. Id.
69. Members Protest, supra note 7, at 1399.
70. Id.
71. H.R. Con. Res. 246,102d.Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); Gejdenson Says NAFTA Must Address
Both Trade and Environmental Issues, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 1822-23 (Dec. 11, 1991).
72. Members Agree to Develop Proposal on GATT Changes to Protect Environment, 8 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1428 (Oct. 2, 1991).
73. Sixty-three senators signed a letter from the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation to President Bush, urging the President to block adoption of the panel
report. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Panel Report on Tuna-Dolphins, 137
CONG. REc. S15,245-46 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) (letter by the Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation introduced by Sen. Hollings). The senators expressed a willingness to
investigate any bilateral or multilateral agreements that might be needed to make application
of the MMPA possible, and urged the President not to act without Senate consultation. Id. In
remarks on the Senate floor, Senator Ernest Hollings (D-SC) called for immediate action to
resolve the conflict, and stated that the administration should not wait for the conclusion of the
current GATT round to do so. Id.
74. Members Agree to Develop Proposal on GATT Changes to Protect Environment, supra note
72, at 1428-29.
75. Mathews, supra note 67, at A21.
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settlement machinery, complaining that the panels' behind-closed-doors
decision-making process is secretive and undemocratic.76
A. The Effect of the Panel Decision on NAFTA Negotiations
The controversy is affecting the ongoing NAFTA7 negotiations. In
a press release, Representative Boxer cited the talks (which are currently
being conducted between Mexico and the United States), and suggested
that the Mexican actions with GATr may imperil that agreement.'
Senator Hollings reminded President Bush of his commitment not to
allow NAFTA to weaken domestic environmental standards.' Private
parties already are proposing that NAFTA should include explicit
environmental protection provisions.'
Neither the Mexican nor the United States government wants to see
NAFTA fail. The two sides have responded to the criticism by
attempting to settle the dispute bilaterally, so as to make adoption of the
panel report unnecessary.8' President Salinas has announced that
Mexico will defer enforcement of the GATT ruling.82 The Bush
administration has proposed that Congress should end the tuna embargo
in exchange for a five-year moratorium on purse-seine fishing to begin
in 1994.' Mexico and the United States have expressed to the GATT
Council their belief that a bilateral approach is the best way to settle the
76. See, e.g., Nancy Dunne, Fears over "Gattzilla the Trade Monster", FIN. TIMES, Jan. 30,
1992, at 3; David Dodwell, Trade Row Looms Over U.S.' s Dolphin-Friendly Tuna Policy, FN. TIMES,
Jan. 30, 1992, at 22.
77. Joint Statement Announcing Canada-Mexico-United States Trilateral Free Trade
Negotiations, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 133 (Feb. 5, 1991).
78. Rep. Boxer wondered whether Mexico's actions cast doubts upon its environmental
protection credentials and noted that President Bush told Congress that NAFTA would not
compromise the United States' abilities to protect the environment. Members Protest, supra note
7, at 1399.
79. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Panel Report on Tuna-Dolphins, supra
note 73, at S15,246.
80. Groups Call for Environmental Clauses in North American Free Trade Agreement, 14 Int'l
Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 497 (Sept. 11, 1991).
81. EC, Others Pressure U.S., Mexico to Accept GATT Yellowfin Tuna Report, Int'l Trade Daily
(BNA), Mar. 19, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
82. Salinas Woos US Dolphin Activists; Having Won in GATT, He Seeks Voluntary Lifting of
Ban, Latin Am. Wkly. Rep., Oct. 10, 1991, at 11, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
Salinas announced the creation of a dolphin protection plan, the "Programa de Proteccion al
Delfin." The plan visualizes strict sanctions for activities that harm dolphins, and includes
provisions for stationing independent observers on tuna boats. Id. In the meantime, Salinas
hopes the United States and Mexico will be able to reach a bilateral settlement of the dispute.
United States environmental groups immediately denounced the plan as insufficient. Id.
83. Larry B. Stammer, White House Urges End to Ban on Mexican Tuna, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
5,1992, at A3. Under such a proposal, affected nations would have to agree to the moratorium
and work in the interim to reduce dolphin kills. Id.
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problem.' It remains to be seen whether these attempts will be
successful.'
Ironically, while the United States and Mexico try to settle the issue,
third countries continue to press for adoption of the panel decision.8
As stated above, the MMPA contains provisions calling for intermediary
nation embargoes.' On January 10, 1992, pursuant to a court order, the
United States was instructed to institute such an embargo.' The Bush
administration tried and failed to have the ruling stayed.89 The
intermediary nation embargo took effect on January 31, 1992, and affects
tuna imports from Italy, France, Spain, and other countries. 90
In response to the United States action, the Venezuelan government,
whose tuna fleet's exports were also affected by the ban, announced its
intention to prepare its own complaint for presentation to GATT if either
Mexico fails to enforce its ruling or the United States fails to cancel its
embargo.9' Like Venezuela, the European Community (EC) has
threatened to launch an independent complaint if the decision is not
adopted.' Although Venezuela's concerns might be allayed if the
United States lifts the embargo, the EC and twelve other nations have
asked the GATT Council to adopt the decision even if a bilateral
settlement is reached.'
V. POSSIBLE UNITED STATES RESPONSES TO THE PANEL
DECISION
If a bilateral settlement proves unworkable, Mexico may still decide
to present the panel decision to the GATT Council. Alternatively, the EC
and others may push the Council to adopt the decision even if Mexico
84. EC, Others Pressure U.S., Mexico to Accept GATT Yellowfin Tuna Report, supra note 81.
85. The Administration's plan has been criticized by some members of Congress and by
environmentalists. Tuna: US Plan to Lift Embargo Draws Fire, Greenwire, Mar. 19, 1992, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
86. Trade: GATT Keeps Tuna Fish Dispute Alive, Inter Press Service, Mar. 19, 1992, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
87. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 41.
89. Appeals Court Lets Tuna Embargo Stand, WASH. TIMEs, Feb. 16, 1992, at A2.
90. Randall Palmer, EC and Others Attack U.S. Tuna Embargo at GAIT Council, The Reuter
Lib. Rep., Feb. 18, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
91. Alejandro Kirk, Venezuela: Offensive on All Fronts Against U.S. Tuna Embargo, Inter
Press Service, Jan. 29, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
92. GATT Postpones Controversial Fishing Decision, UPI, Feb. 18, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Omni File.
93. EC, Others Pressure U.S., Mexico to Accept GATT Yellowfin Tuna Report, supra note 81.
The twelve nations were Argentina, Canada, India, Peru, Japan, Colombia, Senegal, South
Korea, New Zealand, Pakistan, Brazil, and Hong Kong. Id. An EC representative said the
issues raised by the ruling are "too important to be set aside." Id.
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and the United States reach a bilateral agreement. 4 In either case, the
United States will have to decide how to respond. There are three
principal options. First, the United States may join the consensus in
adopting the decision.' Second, it may use a unilateral veto to block
a consensus and thereby prevent the decision from being adopted.96
Third, it may take steps to amend or otherwise modify GATT.9  It is
unlikely that the United States would adopt the decision, given the
domestic political difficulties that the Bush administration would
encounter in attempting to amend the MMPA. 98 It is equally unlikely
that the United States would use a unilateral veto to block its adoption,
as the United States is one of the strongest proponents of GAIT and
would probably not want to risk weakening the system.99 The
remaining option - amending or modifying the treaty - will be
discussed in the following section, which discusses the inherent conflict
between trade and the environment.1°° It is important to note that
even if the United States and Mexico reach a settlement and the decision
is not adopted, the issues raised by the decision will remain. Conflicts
between GATT and environmental laws are sure to reoccur in future
years,'01 and the tuna/dolphin dispute provides a model for examining
this larger problem.
94. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
95. Members Agree to Develop Proposal on GATT Changes to Protect Environment, supra note
72. These alternatives were set forth by Joshua Bolten, general counsel for the Office of the
United States Trade Representative. He noted that the options are not mutually exclusive, and
that there are many different variants that might be considered. Id.
96. Id. GAIT relies on consensus voting in adopting panel decisions. JACKSON, supra
note 50, at 22-23. Thus, a country dissatisfied with a decision may block its adoption by
withholding consent. Id. at 66. In effect, this gives every contracting party a unilateral veto.
Id. at 23.
97. Members Agree to Develop Proposal on GATT Changes to Protect Environment, supra note
72.
98. At the March 18, 1992, meeting of the GATT Council, United States Ambassador
Rufus Yerxa stated that the United States would not currently be able to allow adoption of the
report. Randall Palmer, U.S. Tuna Embargo May Be Lifted, The Reuter Bus. Rep., Mar. 18, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
99. Mathews, supra note 67.
100. See infra parts V.A.2.-4.
101. For example, a number of states and localities in the United States have enacted
statutes requiring that a certain percentage of recycled paper be used in the production of
newsprint. Canada is rich in timber and has few recycling facilities. Under the panel decision,
the United States statutes may violate GATr by placing Canada at a competitive disadvantage
with respect to newsprint manufacturing. C. Foster Knight, Effects of National Environmental
Regulation on International Trade and Investment-Selected Issues, 10 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 212,
214 (1991). See also Bertrand Marotte, Environmental Worries Build Walls to World Trade, OTTAWA
CITIZEN, Feb. 23, 1992, at E2 (environmentalists in Europe have been pressing for a ban on
Canadian paper products manufactured using chlorine bleach; the ban might be GATT-violative
under the panel decision).
Spring 1992]
356 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 2:2
A. Resolving the Tension Between Trade and the Environment
There are several possible approaches for reconciling the conflict
between trade and the environment. One option, advocated by the
GATT panel itself, is the use of a multilateral process to achieve the
results that the United States currently is attempting to achieve
unilaterally." Another approach is to amend, modify, or waive GATI'
provisions. A third strategy may be to use consumer power to force
producers to change production methods when those methods have
detrimental environmental effects."° Each of these approaches will be
considered separately.
1. A Multilateral Treaty Regime. In contrast to the widespread
opposition toward the panel decision in the United States, the
international community is virtually unanimous in its support for the
initial position taken by Mexico. Eleven nations submitted third-party
statements in the proceedings, none of which supported the United
States position."°  Many countries are uncomfortable with the
unilateral nature of the MMPA provisions, and instead suggest
addressing the tuna/dolphin issue through international consultation,
multilateral agreement, or amendment of GATI. 05 The panel itself
echoed these sentiments, stating that multilateral agreements could best
address problems of this type."
When a majority of countries agree that a particular practice is
undesirable, multilateral efforts to address the problem can be quite
successful. An example of this is the recent decision by the United
Nations to ban driftnet fishing worldwide by the end of 1992.07 The
driftnet issue had been vexing environmentalists for years, and until
recently they had made little progress in convincing the fishing fleets of
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan (the countries performing the majority
of driftnet fishing) to abandon the practice. Then, in 1989, the United
Nations passed a resolution calling for a moratorium on the practice."
102. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. The recent victory by environmentalists in
securing a worldwide ban in driftnet fishing will be instructive in this regard.
103. This approach was valuable in helping halt United States dolphin killings in
connection with the "Dolphin-safe" campaign. See infra notes 170-76 and accompanying text.
104. Panel Decision, supra note 2, paras. 4.1-4.30. Third parties submitting statements
included Australia, Canada, the EC, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Norway, the Philippines, Senegal,
Thailand, and Venezuela. Id.
105. See id.
106. The decision specifically referred to "international cooperative arrangements." Id.
para. 5.28. If parties remain intent upon addressing these issues through GATT, however, the
Panel suggests that amendment of the treaty might be necessary. Id. para. 6.3.
107. G.A. Res. 44/225, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Agenda Item 82(0, at 147, U.N. Doc.
A/44/746/Add.7, at 21 (1989).
108. Id.
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On August 2, 1991, the United States Senate passed a bill calling for
product sanctions on countries violating the United Nations
resolution."° Groups in Japan hinted at possible retaliation."' Then,
on November 26, Japan reversed course and announced its intention to
abide by the resolution."' The Japanese foreign ministry stated that
they had "no alternative" but to adhere to the United Nations resolution
in the face of almost unanimous world-wide opposition to driftnet
fishing.' Taiwan had already announced its intention to discontinue
driftnetting, and South Korea followed suit within days of Japan's
announcement." The threatened United States sanctions were never
imposed, and the Japanese did not complain to GAT.
The success of the driftnet ban suggests that multilateral agreements
may provide a solution to the conflict between trade and environmental
measures. Unfortunately, there are complications with pursuing a
multilateral approach. First, concluding multilateral agreements is a
slow process which often requires flexibility and a willingness to
compromise on the part of the parties involved. The driftnet ban, for
example, worked only because the driftnetting nations bowed to
international political and moral pressure."' Had Japan chosen to
challenge the ban under GATF, it is likely that it would have prevailed
in light of the panel decision."' This need for compromise has
spawned congressional fears that a multilateral approach to reconciling
the conflict between trade and environmental goals will lead to dilution
of United States environmental standards."
6
Second, while multilateral approaches can be effective where there
is widespread condemnation of a practice or recognition of a problem,
109. S. 884, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
110. Alan Macnow, a representative for the Japanese Fisheries Association, warned that
Japan might bar United States fish products. He admitted, however, that he was not speaking
for the Japanese government. Japan Fishery Group Warns ofRetaliation if U.S. Action on Driftnets
"Unjustified", 8 Intel Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 40, at 1464 (Oct. 9, 1991).
111. Carol Emert, U.S. Lawmakers Claim Credit for Japan's Ban on Driftnets, States News
Serv., Nov. 26, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
112. Vibeke Laroi, Japan Bows to Pressure, Bans Driftnet Fishing from End of 1992, The Reuter
Bus. Rep., Nov. 26, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
113. South Korea Urged to Join "Wall of Death" Driftnet Ban, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 27, 1991,
at A4. An example of the speed of the about-face is the reaction of South Korea. On November
27, 1991, the day after the Japanese announcement, the South Korean embassy in Washington
disclaimed any plans to emulate the Japanese action. Id. By December 4, 1991, however, they
had announced their intention to join the ban. See Albert M. Manville, U.N. Passes Global
Driftnet Ban; Reprieve for the Marine Environment, At Last, U.S. Newswire, Dec. 20, 1991, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File; South Korea Likely to Follow Japan and Halt Driftnet Fishing,
The Reuter Lib. Rep., Dec. 4, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
114. See Laroi, supra note 112; South Korea Likely to Follow, supra note 113.
115. The ban on driftnet-harvested products imposed by the Senate would presumably
have been declared by the GAIT panel to be discriminatory because it focused on the means
of production, as do the MMvIPA provisions. See Panel Decision, supra note 2, para. 5.15.
116. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
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the approach is inadequate when this level of consensus is absent. In the
tuna/dolphin dispute, for example, there was widespread disapproval
of the unilateral nature of the United States embargo."7 At present, it
is not clear that a sufficient consensus exists that would make possible
the creation of an international agreement halting the use of purse-seine
nets.
Third, enforcement presents a problem. Countries do not always
abide by the spirit of international agreements, sometimes pursuing
prohibited activities under the guise of permissible activities. 8 This
undermines the intentions of treaty signatories. Declining economic
conditions in some countries are encouraging noncompliance with, and
even abandonment of, multilateral environmental agreements." Such
developments threaten to roll back previous gains made in
environmental conservation. Most importantly, multilateral treaties
invariably accrue free-rider problems, with nonobserving nations
attempting to enjoy the treaties' benefits without observing their
restrictions.'2 After the panel decision, if observing nations cannot
resort to trade measures to enforce treaty provisions against such parties,
the effectiveness of such treaties will be hampered. Under the current
GATT framework, this problem may be unavoidable.'
2. Amending GATT. If a multilateral treaty approach is inadequate
under the current GATT framework, it may be necessary to consider
amending the General Agreement. The GATT panel suggested that if
members intend to use the GATT framework to determine allowable
trade measures for environmental protection, they should do so by
amending or supplementing GAT provisions, or waiving obligations
thereunder, rather than by interpreting Article XX."2 This preference
for amendment or modification of GATT over reliance on the existing
Article XX language reflects the panel's opinion that Article XX does not
provide adequate guidelines for limiting the applicability of its
exceptions." This, in turn, raises the question of whether the conflict
117. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
118. For example, despite agreeing to observe a worldwide ban on whaling, the Japanese
continue to catch whales for "scientific purposes." Laroi, supra note 112.
119. For example, Iceland recently announced its intention to withdraw from the
International Whaling Commission, a move expected to result in a resumption of Icelandic
whaling. Also, several African countries are lobbying for revocation of the treaty banning the
sale of ivory. These actions reflect a willingness on the part of some countries to sacrifice
environmental imperatives in the face of economic necessity. See Keith Schneider, Balancing
Nature's Claims and International Free Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1992, § 4, at 5.
120. Mathews, supra note 67, at A21.
121. A recent speech by GATE Director-General Arthur Dunkel suggested that even
environmental measures reached under multilateral agreements may run afoul of GATE
provisions. Dunne, supra note 76, at 3.
122. See Panel Decision, supra note 2, para. 6.3.
123. See id.
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between trade and the environment can be solved by amending GATT
Article XX to provide such guidelines.
The problem with Article XX stems from its generality. As the panel
noted, the article lists various exceptions to the agreement, but provides
no guidelines for limiting their applicability 24 To remedy this, the
Contracting Parties could amend Article XX to add a provision setting
out such limitations. These might allow nations to restrict or ban
importation of certain products pursuant to international agreement. For
example, the provision might state that import restrictions will be
applied only in those instances where the products in question have
been specifically addressed in treaties drafted .under United Nations
auspices. Parties would then be free to set their own standards for those
products, including import bans."2
This approach is already used outside of the GATT framework. For
example, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer, sponsored by the United Nations, regulates the amount of ozone-
depleting chemicals that signatory nations may produce.26 In order
to encourage nonsignatories to sign the treaty the protocol provides for
bans on the importation of ozone-depleting substances from nonparty
nations."2 Further, the protocol envisions the extension of these bans
to products that contain ozone-depleting substances, and the possible
ban of products produced with such substances.'28
After the panel decision, the latter provision appears to be
challengeable under GATT. Banning products that are produced using
ozone-depleting substances is analogous to banning tuna produced using
methods that harm dolphins. In both cases, products are banned
because of the way they are produced, rather than because they are
harmful in and of themselves. Because the decision also stated that
countries cannot impose import restrictions on products merely because
they originate in countries with different environmental policies than
their own, 2 9 the remainder of the Montreal Protocol may be
challengeable, as well. Free riders may be able to ignore an agreement's
prescriptions, then complain under GATT if their actions are challenged
124. Id. See GAIT, supra note 1, art. XX, 61 Stat. at A60-61, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262.
125. Representative Donald Pease has introduced legislation in the House calling on
President Bush to initiate negotiations to amend Article XX to provide exceptions for those
trade measures having environmental protection intent. H.R. Con. Res. 247, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1991). Representative Pease's proposal suggests that such exceptions should be especially
allowable in those situations when the U.N. and other international organizations have already
set minimum standards. Id.
126. Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, art. 4, 26 I.L.M.
1541, 1554-55 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
127. Id. art. 4(4), 26 I.L.M. at 1555.
128. Id.
129. Panel Decision, supra note 2, para. 6.2.
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by signatory nations. Amending Article XX to allow enforcement of
such bans within a GATT context should remedy this problem.
Amending Article XX, however, will require approval by two-thirds
of the GATT signatories."3 This may not be possible. The developing
nations are not likely to be enthusiastic about a new GATT provision
providing for enforcement of developed-world environmental norms. 3'
The developing world is suspicious of the growing debate over trade
and the environment, fearful that they may become subject to
protectionist embargoes cloaked as environmental measures."2 As
previously discussed, the Mexican government accused the United States
of doing exactly this in the tuna/dolphin dispute." These accusations
ignore the fact that the Bush Administration went on the record as
opposing the embargo and imposed the ban only after being ordered to
do so by a federal judge.' Nevertheless, while these suspicions
continue, gathering the necessary two-thirds vote needed for amendment
of GATT will be difficult.
3. Modifying GA7T: An Environmental Code. As the GATT membership
has expanded, and the diversity of views increased, it has become
increasingly difficult to amend GATT.3  Therefore, a better approach
might be to negotiate a "side agreement.""3  Such an agreement,
negotiated in the context of GATr, would exist as a "stand-alone" treaty
that would obligate only signatory nations. 137 This approach may be
useful in resolving the trade/environment conflict.
In response to the panel decision, and in recognition of the effects
that inconsistent international environmental standards may have on the
"level playing field," Senator Max Baucus has proposed the creation of
a GATT Environmental Code similar to the GATT Subsidies Code.1'
130. GATr, supra note 1, art. XXX(1), 61 Stat. at A74, 55 U.N.T.S. at 282.
131. Developing nations are concerned with what is sometimes labelled "environmental
imperialism." See Note, Promoting International Environmental Protections Through Foreign Debt
Exchange Transactions, 24 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 65, 66 (1991). For a discussion of the concerns of
developing nations with developed world attempts to impose environmental constraints upon
them that the developed world did not themselves observe when they were first industrializing,
see infra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
132. Alexander MacLeod, GAT Report Draws Fire from Environmentalists in Runup to Key
Summits, CHRMSTIAN SCI. MONTrOR, Feb. 18,1992, at 4 (quoting Marina Elana Hurtado, London
Director of the World Development Movement).
133. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
135. Indeed, "[it is generally considered today almost impossible to amend GATT because
of the stringent vote and procedural requirements, coupled with the wide divergence of
interests among the ... membership." JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM J. DAVEY, INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 310-11 (1986).
136. Id. at 311.
137. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYsrEM 56 (1989).
138. 137 CONG. REC. S13,169 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1991) (statement of Sen. Baucus). The
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Senator Baucus' proposal relies on imposition of countervailing
duties139 on imports from countries whose environmental standards
(and thus compliance costs) are lower than those in the importing
country."4 A dispute settlement panel would be created to settle
disputes over the operation of the code, and countries would be allowed
to ban completely importation of certain goods that violate international
agreements.'
Senator Baucus sees his plan as having three effects. First, as stated
above, it would serve to "level the playing field" for those industries
operating in countries with high environmental standards." Second,
the plan would remove the economic incentive for lower standards and
thereby encourage nations to raise their own levels of environmental
protection." Third, Baucus asserts that it would remedy the problems
created by the panel decision.' The last point is subject to challenge.
Unfortunately, Senator Baucus' plan will not solve the tuna/dolphin
issue. Under his proposal, the United States at most would be able to
place import duties on tuna products from those countries engaging in
purse-seine fishing. Complete import bans would be limited to those
products violating "internationally recognized norms.""4 As noted
above, purse-seine fishing does not yet fit that category' 46
For that matter, it is not even certain that the United States would be
allowed to impose duties. Senator Baucus' proposal requires that the
environmental standards imposed have a "scientific basis."147  It is
questionable whether the MMPA provisions meet this test. In the
GAIT Subsidies Code permits imposition of countervailing duties by an importing country to
offset subsidies by exporting countries. The Code requires a showing of injury to domestic
industries before imposition of duties is allowed. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade:
Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII, entered into force Jan. 1, 1980, 31
U.S.T. 513.
139. Countervailing duties are tariffs imposed on the products of an exporting country by
an importing country to offset the exporting country's subsidies. GARY HUFBAUER & JOANNA
SHELTON ERB, SUBsrDnm IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE xiv (1984).
140. The proposal envisions each country setting its own environmental standards, with
countervailing duties being available under certain controlled conditions. First, the protection
standards would have to have a sound scientific basis. (The term "scientific basis" is not
defined in the proposal.) Second, the standards would have to be equally applied to all
domestic production. Third, there would have to be a showing of injury to domestic industries
before imposition of duties would be allowed. 137 CONG. REC., supra note 138, at S13,169.
141. For example, products taken with driftnets could be completely banned. Id. The
latter provision would solve the problem raised in the previous section, i.e., the possibility that
the Japanese, rather than observe the driftnet ban, could have gone to GATT and won under
the reasoning of the panel decision.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
147. 137 CONG. REC., supra note 138, at S13,169.
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tuna/dolphin dispute, Mexico claimed that, according to the Convention
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna
(CITES) 48 and the IATTC, ETP dolphins are not in danger of
extinction.'9 If the only basis for the MMPA provisions is moral, the
United States will have no recourse to countervailing duties.
At any rate, a United States proposal to draft an environmental code
is likely to be controversial. In a recent report on trade and the
environment,"s4 GATT challenges the idea that differing environmental
standards in different countries constitute unfair trade practices."' 1 The
report labels as "highly divisive" any scheme that would impose duties
on countries with "lower" environmental standards than those of the
imposing country."2 GATT claims that differences between countries
in levels of environmental protection are little different from differences
in tax, immigration, or education policies, and provide no more sufficient
a basis upon which to impose duties.5 3
Further problems arise when the Baucus plan is applied to the
developing nations. Senator Baucus' code proposal would use
countervailing duties to nudge countries toward adopting higher
environmental policies."M It is not clear that developing nations have
the financial resources necessary to enact such measures. 55
Considering the precarious state of many of these states' economies, it is
not even dear that this should be a first priority.'T 6 The developing
nations accuse the developed nations of holding them to a double
standard by condemning them for practices the developed nations
themselves engaged in when they were first industrializing.5 7 Because
the code would apply only to signatories, its effectiveness would be
significantly diluted if the developing nations refused to join the
agreement.l s
148. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna,
July 1, 1975, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.
149. Panel Decision, supra note 2, para. 3.44.
150. Trade and the Environment, GATT Doc. 1529 (Feb. 3, 1992) (on file with Office of the
United States Trade Representative) [hereinafter GATT Report].
151. Id. at 16-21.
152. Id. at 19.
153. Id. at 20.
154. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
155. Stephen L. Kass & Michael B. Gerrard, International Trade, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 24, 1992, at
29.
156. Id.
157. See Michael S. Feeley & Elizabeth Knier, Environmental Considerations of the Emerging
United States-Mexico Free Trade Agreement, 2 DUKE J. COMP. & IN L L. 259 (1992).
158. Senator David Boren has introduced legislation that could serve to encourage
accession. International Pollution Deterrence Act of 1991, S. 984, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
This proposed Act would impose countervailing duties much like those envisioned by the
Baucus Code, but it would use the receipts from the duties to finance transfer of pollution
control technology to the developing nations. Dunne, supra note 10, at 6. With this plan,
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A final problem with an environmental code is its potentially broad
scope. The United States should consider carefully the possible reach of
such an agreement. It may easily be imagined that low United States
gasoline taxes, for example, could be declared an unfair trade subsidy,
in which case countervailing duties could be imposed against a wide
range of United States products. It seems improbable that the United
States is prepared to accept such a result. 9
4. Waiver of GATT obligations. Article XXV of GATI provides for
waiver of GATT obligations under "exceptional circumstances not
elsewhere provided for" in the agreement." If amending the General
Agreement proves impossible, and the drafting of a side agreement is
unworkable, the waiver provisions may yet provide a method within the
existing GATr framework for accommodating trade measures with
environmental concerns.
Under Article XXV, a two-thirds majority of votes cast is sufficient
to grant a waiver of GATI obligations. 6' The GATT report on trade
and the environment asserts that parties to multilateral environmental
agreements will be able to avoid challenges to the consistency of the
trade agreements with GATT through use of the waiver provisions.162
Theoretically, this provides a method for addressing the free-rider
problem discussed earlier - if the consistency of a particular trade
measure is challenged by a nonsignatory to a multilateral agreement, the
signatory nations will be able to secure a waiver of GATT obligations
with regard to that agreement.'"
It is unlikely that the United States would be able to secure a waiver
for the MMPA, considering the extent of international opposition to its
unilateral nature.'" It may be possible, however, for the United States
to negotiate a multilateral agreement providing for the protection of
dolphins or the abolition of purse-seine fishing, and then to secure a
waiver of GATT obligations with regard to that agreement. In its third-
party submission to the tuna/dolphin panel, the EC, for example, stated
that it was "ready to offer its full support to ... reinforce international
cooperation on the problems raised by the incidental kill of migratory
developing nations could improve their environmental regimes with duties paid by developed
world consumers. If a nation opts not to join the code, however, it will not receive these
benefits. See JOAN E. TWIGGS, THE TOKYO ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: A
CASE STUDY IN BUILDING DOMESTIc SUPPORT FOR DIPLOMAcY 77 (1987). This should serve as
an incentive to adopt the code.
159. See Kass & Gerrard, supra note 155, at 29.
160. GATr, supra note 1, art. XXV(5), 61 Stat. at A68, 55 U.N.T.S. 272-74.
161. Id. The majority must include more than half of all contracting parties. Id.
162. GATT Report, supra note 150, at 12.
163. Id.
164. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
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species." 65 It is even possible that Mexico might join such a
multilateral agreement since, as discussed earlier, Mexico has already
signalled its willingness to join in imposing a moratorium on the use of
purse-seine nets.1'
A question remains as to whether the Article XXV waiver provisions
will provide a long-term solution to the trade/environment conflict. The
fact that a waiver requires a two-thirds vote by a majority of the
contracting parties inherently limits its usefulness.67 While it is true
that this requirement will "ensure that the proposed trade policy actions
would ... have broad support among the GATT membership,"" 6 it
will also ensure that only the least controversial of measures are likely
to gain waivers. By disallowing the use of trade sanctions to enforce
treaty compliance against nonsignatories, the panel decision increases the
temptation to free ride and reduces the incentive to sign. This reduces
the likelihood that any given multilateral agreement will obtain the
majority of nations needed to secure a waiver.
Furthermore, waivers are viewed as exceptional remedies intended
for only short-term application.69 As conflicts between trade and the
environment are expected to increase in the future, one must question
whether this remedy will prove adequate. Finally, under the waiver
approach, trade measures imposed for environmental protection
purposes would provisionally be invalid until a waiver is obtained. This
suggests a hierarchy, with trade paramount and the environment
secondary, that may well be subject to challenge.
5. Consumer Power as Environmental Protector. Thus far, each of the
options discussed requires some measure of multilateral consensus to be
successful. This may well leave the tuna/dolphin issue unresolved, since
it remains unclear how countries can protect those environmental
concerns that lack this level of consensus. The panel decision may have
left open a way to achieve this end - through the harnessing of
consumer forces.
Although the panel ruled against the United States in most respects,
one United States measure with extraterritorial effect was found not to
violate GATT. The Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act 70
provides guidelines for marking tuna products as being dolphin-safe.
The Act's provisions are such that purse-seine harvested tuna do not
meet the labeling requirements." Although the Mexican government
165. Panel Decision, supra note 2, para. 4.10.
166. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
168. GA7T Report, supra note 150, at 12.
169. Id.
170. 16 U.S.C.. § 1385.
171. Id. § 1385(d)(1)(B).
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challenged the Act in its complaint,"7 the labeling scheme was
upheld." The panel noted that the law does not require the dolphin-
safe label; tuna products may be sold freely with or without it.74 The
effectiveness of the conservation effort depends entirely upon consumer
preference and therefore does not constitute a government-imposed
advantage.17
This suggests an approach for protecting these special environmental
concerns. When an environmental protection measure important to the
United States lacks the level of international consensus needed to secure
an international agreement, private consumer boycotts can be organized
against the offending products. Meanwhile, the United States could
continue to advocate the creation of an international agreement. Such
efforts would not appear to run afoul of GAT.
The utility of this approach is limited. Although it has been
successful, the dolphin-safe scheme only halted dolphin killings by the
United States tuna fleet and by those countries' fleets that sought to
avoid the United States embargo. Other countries have continued the
killings leading to the imposition of the embargo by the United States.
Furthermore, the success of the dolphin-safe labeling scheme is at least
partly due to the high degree of public sympathy aroused by dolphins.
It is unlikely that this aproach would be as effective for issues that have
less positive images," for success requires consumers to boycott
offending products to the extent that noncompliance becomes
economically unfeasible. Still, labeling schemes may be the only non-
GATT violative methods available under the current GATT regime for
extraterritorial enforcement of United States environmental standards.
VI. CONCLUSION
Reconciling GATT with environmental protection goals promises to
be an arduous task. Although many in the United States believe that the
United States has the right to enforce its conservation policies
worldwide, much of the international community disagrees. This
ensures that future efforts to engage in such actions are likely to result
in further conflicts. Though Mexico decided not to push for adoption of
the panel decision, this was largely due to recognition of the effect that
172. Panel Decision, supra note 2, para. 3.3.
173. Id. para. 5.42.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. For example, the United Nations, in a report on driftnetting, noted that the practice
leads to the deaths of large numbers of sharks. Because sharks are viewed less positively than
marine mammals, this fact is largely ignored. Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing and Its Impact
on the Living Marine Resources of the World's Oceans and Seas, Report of the Secretary-General, 45th
Sess., Agenda Item 79, para. 59, U.N. Doc. A/45/663 (1990).
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its adoption would have on the continuing NAFTA negotiations. These
special circumstances are unlikely to recur.
Unfortunately, the panel decision, if adopted, would render
inadequate existing multilateral approaches for dealing with the conflict
between trade and the environment. Multilateral environmental
agreements will be greatly weakened if signatories are unable to use
trade measures to protect against free riders, and the panel decision
increases the incentive for nations to free ride. Though the GATT report
on trade and the environment suggests that this problem may be
remedied by use of GATT waiver provisions, the high voting
requirements needed for obtaining waivers makes this only a partial
solution. Indeed, the panel decision's prohibition of trade measures
decreases the likelihood that waivers will be secured.
This suggests that changes to GATT will be necessary. Amending
GATT is extremely difficult, and it is unlikely that this is a realistic
option. At the same time, an environmental code approach is inherently
limited by the fact that it is applicable only to signatories. Moreover, an
environmental code would be a double-edged sword that could well
affect the United States in politically unacceptable ways. It remains to
be seen whether other options will surface.
In the meantime, careful drafting of legislation can limit future GATT
violations. For example, there are certain steps that may be taken to
lessen the GATT-violative nature of the MMPA. Applying a numerical
ceiling for dolphin takings to foreign tuna fleets, similar to the 20,500
ceiling applied to the United States tuna fleet, would lessen charges of
discriminatory treatment. Expanding the ban beyond the ETP to cover
all of the world's oceans should have a similar effect. If it is true that
dolphins associate with tuna only in the ETP, this should have no effect
on the United States fleet.
Despite the controversy caused by the United States ban, it clearly
led many nations to change their fishing methods to abandon purse-
seining. This suggests that unilateral action by the United States will
remain an option to be considered where the benefits to be gained
outweigh the international political costs. Extraterritorial application of
United States laws is likely to cause resentment, however, and may well
prove counterproductive. Further, if this practice became widespread,
it would eventually weaken GATr. A clear solution to the conflict
between trade and environmental protection remains elusive.
David J. Ross
